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Abstract: The present study further strengthens the use of the Keedwell CIPQ against
attack on a system by the use of the Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ for cryptography in a
similar spirit in which the cross inverse property has been used by Keedwell. This is done
as follows. By constructing two S-isotopic S-quasigroups(loops) U and V such that their
Smarandache automorphism groups are not trivial, it is shown that U is a SCIPQ(SCIPL)
if and only if V is a SCIPQ(SCIPL). Explanations and procedures are given on how these
SCIPQs can be used to double encrypt information.
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§1. Introduction
1.1 Quasigroups and Loops
Let L be a non-empty set. Define a binary operation (·) on L : If x · y ∈ L for all x, y ∈ L,
(L, ·) is called a groupoid. If the system of equations ;
a · x = b and y · a = b
have unique solutions for x and y respectively, then (L, ·) is called a quasigroup. For each
x ∈ L, the elements xρ = xJρ, xλ = xJλ ∈ L such that xxρ = eρ and xλx = eλ are called
the right, left inverses of x respectively. Now, if there exists a unique element e ∈ L called
the identity element such that for all x ∈ L, x · e = e · x = x, (L, ·) is called a loop. To
every loop (L, ·) with automorphism group AUM(L, ·), there corresponds another loop. Let
the set H = (L, ·) × AUM(L, ·). If we define ’◦’ on H such that (α, x) ◦ (β, y) = (αβ, xβ · y)
for all (α, x), (β, y) ∈ H , then H(L, ·) = (H, ◦) is a loop as shown in Bruck [6] and is called the
Holomorph of (L, ·).
A loop is a weak inverse property loop(WIPL) if and only if it obeys the identity
x(yx)ρ = yρ or (xy)λx = yλ.
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A loop(quasigroup) is a cross inverse property loop(quasigroup)[CIPL(CIPQ)] if and only
if it obeys the identity
xy · xρ = y or x · yxρ = y or xλ · (yx) = y or xλy · x = y.
A loop(quasigroup) is an automorphic inverse property loop(quasigroup)[AIPL(AIPQ)] if
and only if it obeys the identity
(xy)ρ = xρyρ or (xy)λ = xλyλ.
The set SYM(G, ·) = SYM(G) of all bijections in a groupoid (G, ·) forms a group called
the permutation(symmetric) group of the groupoid (G, ·). Consider (G, ·) and (H, ◦) been two
distinct groupoids(quasigroups, loops). Let A,B and C be three distinct non-equal bijective
mappings, that maps G onto H . The triple α = (A,B,C) is called an isotopism of (G, ·) onto
(H, ◦) if and only if
xA ◦ yB = (x · y)C ∀ x, y ∈ G.
If (G, ·) = (H, ◦), then the triple α = (A,B,C) of bijections on (G, ·) is called an autotopism
of the groupoid(quasigroup, loop) (G, ·). Such triples form a group AUT (G, ·) called the au-
totopism group of (G, ·). Furthermore, if A = B = C, then A is called an automorphism
of the groupoid(quasigroup, loop) (G, ·). Such bijections form a group AUM(G, ·) called the
automorphism group of (G, ·).
As observed by Osborn [17], a loop is a WIPL and an AIPL if and only if it is a CIPL.
The past efforts of Artzy [1]-[4], Belousov and Tzurkan [5] and recent studies of Keedwell [12],
Keedwell and Shcherbacov [13]-[15] are of great significance in the study of WIPLs, AIPLs,
CIPQs and CIPLs, their generalizations(i.e m-inverse loops and quasigroups, (r,s,t)-inverse
quasigroups) and applications to cryptography.
Interestingly, Huthnance [7] showed that if (L, ·) is a loop with holomorph (H, ◦), (L, ·) is
a WIPL if and only if (H, ◦) is a WIPL. But the holomorphic structure of AIPL and a CIPL
has just been revealed by Ja´ıye´o.la´ [11].
In the quest for the application of CIPQs with long inverse cycles to cryptography, Keedwell
[12] constructed the following CIPQ which we shall specifically call Keedwell CIPQ.
Theorem 1.1 Let (G, ·) be an abelian group of order n such that n+ 1 is composite. Define a
binary operation ’◦’ on the elements of G by the relation a ◦ b = arbs, where rs = n+ 1. Then
(G, ◦) is a CIPQ and the right crossed inverse of the element a is au, where u = (−r)3
The author also gave examples and detailed explanation and procedures of the use of this
CIPQ for cryptography. Cross inverse property quasigroups have been found appropriate for
cryptography because of the fact that the left and right inverses xλ and xρ of an element x do
not coincide unlike in left and right inverse property loops, hence this gave rise to what is called
cycle of inverses or inverse cycles or simply cycles, i.e finite sequence of elements x1, x2, · · · , xn
such that xρk = xk+1 mod n. The number n is called the length of the cycle. The origin of the
idea of cycles can be traced back to Artzy [1],[4] where he also found there existence in WIPLs
apart form CIPLs. In his two papers, he proved some results on possibilities for the values of
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n and for the number m of cycles of length n for WIPLs and especially CIPLs. We call these
Cycle Theorems for now.
In application, it is assumed that the message to be transmitted can be represented as single
element x of a quasigroup (L, ·) and that this is enciphered by multiplying by another element
y of L so that the encoded message is yx. At the receiving end, the message is deciphered
by multiplying by the right inverse yρ of y. If a left(right) inverse quasigroup is used and the
left(right) inverse of x is xλ (xρ), then the left(right) inverse of xλ (xρ) is necessarily x. But if
a CIPQ is used, this is not necessary the situation. This fact makes an attack on the system
more difficult in the case of CIPQs.
1.2 Smarandache Quasigroups and Loops
The study of Smarandache loops was initiated by W. B. Vasantha Kandasamy in 2002. In
her book [19], she defined a Smarandache loop(S-loop) as a loop with at least a subloop which
forms a subgroup under the binary operation of the loop. In [9], the present author defined
a Smarandache quasigroup(S-quasigroup) to be a quasigroup with at least a non-trivial as-
sociative subquasigroup called a Smarandache subsemigroup (S-subsemigroup). Examples of
Smarandache quasigroups are given in Muktibodh [16]. In her book, she introduced over 75
Smarandache concepts on loops. In her first paper [20], on the study of Smarandache notions
in algebraic structures, she introduced Smarandachely left(right) alternative loops, Bol loops,
Moufang loops, and Bruck loops. In [8], the present author introduced Smarandachely inverse
property loops(IPL) and weak inverse property loops(WIPL).
A quasigroup(loop) is called a Smarandache certain quasigroup(loop) if it has at least a
non-trivial subquasigroup(subloop) with the certain property and the latter is referred to as
the Smarandache certain subquasigroup(subloop). For example, a loop is called a Smarandache
CIPL(SCIPL) if it has at least a non-trivial subloop that is a CIPL and the latter is referred to
as the Smarandache CIP-subloop. By an initial S-quasigroup L with an initial S-subquasigroup
L′, we mean L and L′ are pure quasigroups, i.e. they do not obey a certain property(not of
any variety).
If L is a S-groupoid with a S-subsemigroup H , then the set SSYM(L, ·) = SSYM(L) of
all bijections A in L such that A : H → H forms a group called the Smarandache permuta-
tion(symmetric) group of the S-groupoid. In fact, SSYM(L) 6 SYM(L).
Definition 1.1 Let (L, ·) and (G, ◦) be two distinct groupoids that are isotopic under a triple
(U, V,W ). Now, if (L, ·) and (G, ◦) are S-groupoids with S-subsemigroups L′ and G′ respectively
such that A : L′ → G′, where A ∈ {U, V,W}, then the isotopism (U, V,W ) : (L, ·)→ (G, ◦) is
called a Smarandache isotopism(S-isotopism).
Thus, if U = V = W , then U is called a Smarandache isomorphism. Hence we write
(L, ·) % (G, ◦).
But if (L, ·) = (G, ◦), then the autotopism (U, V,W ) is called a Smarandache autotopism (S-
autotopism) and they form a group SAUT (L, ·) which will be called the Smarandache autotopism
group of (L, ·). Observe that SAUT (L, ·) 6 AUT (L, ·). Furthermore, if U = V =W , then U is
called a Smarandache automorphism of (L, ·). Such Smarandache permutations form a group
A Double Cryptography Using the Smarandache Keedwell Cross Inverse Quasigroup 31
SAUM(L, ·) called the Smarandache automorphism group(SAG) of (L, ·).
Now, set HS = (L, ·) × SAUM(L, ·). If we define ’◦’ on HS such that (α, x) ◦ (β, y) =
(αβ, xβ · y) for all (α, x), (β, y) ∈ HS , then HS(L, ·) = (HS , ◦) is a S-quasigroup(S-loop) with
S-subgroup (H ′, ◦) where H ′ = L′ × SAUM(L) and thus will be called the Smarandache
Holomorph(SH) of (L, ·).
The aim of the present study is to further strengthen the use of the Keedwell CIPQ against
attack on a system by the use of the Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ for cryptography in a similar
spirit in which the cross inverse property has been used by Keedwell. This is done as follows.
By constructing two S-isotopic S-quasigroups(loops) U and V such that their Smarandache
automorphism groups are not trivial, it is shown that U is a SCIPQ(SCIPL) if and only if V
is a SCIPQ(SCIPL). Explanations and procedures are given on how these SCIPQs can be used
to double encrypt information.
§2. Preliminary Results
Definition 2.1(Smarandachely Keedwell CIPQ) Let Q be an initial S-quasigroup with an initial
S-subquasigroup P . Q is called a Smarandachely Keedwell CIPQ(SKCIPQ) if P is isomorphic
to the Keedwell CIPQ, say under a mapping φ.
The following results that have recently been established are of paramount importance to
prove the main result in this paper.
Theorem 2.1(Ja´ıye´o.la´ [10]) Let U = (L,⊕) and V = (L,⊗) be initial S-quasigroups such that
SAUM(U) and SAUM(V ) are conjugates in SSYM(L) i.e there exists a ψ ∈ SSYM(L) such
that for any γ ∈ SAUM(V ), γ = ψ−1αψ where α ∈ SAUM(U). Then, HS(U) % HS(V ) if
and only if xδ ⊗ yγ = (xβ ⊕ y)δ ∀ x, y ∈ L, β ∈ SAUM(U) and some δ, γ ∈ SAUM(V ).
Theorem 2.2(Ja´ıye´o.la´ [11]) The holomorph H(L) of a quasigroup(loop) L is a Smarandache
CIPQ(CIPL) if and only if SAUM(L) = {I} and L is a Smarandache CIPQ(CIPL).
§3. Main Result with Applications
3.1 Main result
Theorem 3.1 Let U = (L,⊕) and V = (L,⊗) be initial S-quasigroups(S-loops) that are
S-isotopic under the triple of the form (δ−1β, γ−1, δ−1) for all β ∈ SAUM(U) and some
δ, γ ∈ SAUM(V ) such that their Smarandache automorphism groups are non-trivial and are
conjugates in SSYM(L) i.e there exists a ψ ∈ SSYM(L) such that for any γ ∈ SAUM(V ),
γ = ψ−1αψ where α ∈ SAUM(U). Then, U is a SCIPQ(SCIPL) if and only if V is a
SCIPQ(SCIPL).
Proof Following Theorem 2.1, HS(U) % HS(V ). Also, by Theorem 2.2, HS(U)(HS(V ))
is a SCIPQ (SCIPL) if and only if SAUM(U) = {I}(SAUM(V ) = {I}) and U(V ) is a
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SCIPQ(SCIPL).
Now let U be an SCIPQ(SCIPL), then since HS(U) has a subquasigroup(subloop) that
is isomorphic to a S-CIP-subquasigroup(subloop) of U and that subquasigroup (subloop) is
isomorphic to a S-subquasigroup(subloop) of HS(V ) which is isomorphic to a S-subquasigroup
(subloop) of V , V is a SCIPQ(SCIPL). The proof for the converse is similar. 
3.2 Application To Cryptography
Let the Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ be the SCIPQ U in Theorem 3.1. Definitely, its Smaran-
dache automorphism group is non-trivial because as shown in Theorem 2.1 of Keedwell [12].
For any CIPQ, the mapping Jρ : x → xρ is an automorphism. This mapping will be trivial
only if the S-CIP-subquasigroup of U is unipotent. For instance, in Example 2.1 of Keedwell
[12], the CIPQ (G, ◦) obtained is unipotent because it was constructed using the cyclic group
C5 =< c : c
5 = e > and defined as a ◦ b = a3b2. But in Example 2.2, the CIPQ gotten is not
unipotent as a result of using the cyclic group C11 =< c : c
11 = e >. Thus, the choice of a
Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ which suits our purpose in this work for a cyclic group of order
n is one in which rs = n+ 1 and r + s 6= n. Now that we have seen a sample for the choice of
U , the initial S-quasigroup V can then be obtained as shown in Theorem 3.1. By Theorem 3.1,
V is a SCIPQ.
Now, according to Theorem 2.1, by the choice of the mappings α, β ∈ SAUM(U) and
ψ ∈ SSYM(L) to get the mappings δ, γ, a SCIPQ V can be produced following Theorem
3.1. So, the secret keys for the systems are {α, β, ψ, φ} ≡ {δ, γ, φ}. Thus whenever a set of
information or messages is to be transmitted, the sender will enciphere in the Smarandache
Keedwell CIPQ by using specifically the S-CIP-subquasigroup in it(as described earlier on in
the introduction) and then enciphere again with {α, β, ψ, φ} ≡ {δ, γ, φ} to get a SCIPQ V which
is the set of encoded messages. At the receiving end, the message V is deciphered by using an
inverse isotopism(i.e inverse key of {α, β, ψ} ≡ {δ, γ}) to get U and then deciphere again(as
described earlier on in the introduction) to get the messages. The secret key can be changed
over time. The method described above is a double encryption and its a double protection.
It protects each piece of information(element of the quasigroup) and protects the combined
information(the quasigroup as a whole). Its like putting on a pair of socks and shoes or putting
on under wears and clothes, the body gets better protection. An added advantage of the use
of Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ over Keedwell CIPQ in double encryption is that the since
the S-CIP-subquasigroups of the Smarandache Keedwell CIPQ in use could be more than one,
then, the S-CIP-subquasigroups can be replaced overtime.
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